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I. Introduction
There were high hopes for a brighter future. After more than two 
decades of conflict, political uncertainty, multiple droughts and Soma-
lia’s worst famine in sixty years, the landscape began to change. The 
Federal Government lost its transitional status and became officially 
recognised by an increasingly long list of countries and institutions.1
An ambitious president was elected. Official delegations began visit-
ing Mogadishu once more, including a visit by United States Secretary 
of State, John Kerry.2 Expectations were high.
It appeared that the recovery was not just political. Economic for-
tunes were improving as well. Trading activity began to increase 
again. Shops reopened, rising numbers of diaspora started return-
ing and investment firms began opening in Mogadishu. The national 
post service resumed operations. The Central Bank Act was passed, 
which simultaneously gave the institution a stronger mandate as well 
as preclude it from lending to the Government.3 A veritable construc-
tion boom kicked off in Mogadishu, the city received its first ATM 
cash machine and in June 2015, an agreement between MasterCard 
and a Somali bank launched the first ever domestic issuance of debit 
cards. The Wall Street Journal wrote of ‘glimmers of hope’4 while Afri-
can Development Bank wrote of a ‘turning point’ due to the ‘positive 
political and security developments as well as the commitment of the 
international community.’5 Emerging from the clamour of countless 
conferences, consultations, summits and high-level meetings, a belief 
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was emerging that this time, something was different. This time, Soma-
lia was recovering.
Or was it? What turn did Somalia take? As the Federal Government 
approaches its fifth year, new developments have raised concern over 
the trajectory and pace of progress. The Prime Minister was dismissed 
by a no-confidence motion in December 2014. The new Prime Minister, 
Mr Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmake, took three attempts to success-
fully appoint a new cabinet endorsed by parliament. Concerns about 
corruption have threatened the steady flow of development finance. 
High profile attacks by Al Shabaab, both within Somalia and beyond, 
have raised questions about whether the organisation can be con-
tained. Meanwhile, instability in Yemen has led to large numbers of 
refugees arriving into Somalia.6
It seems timely, therefore, to reassess the pace of progress and tra-
jectory of recovery in Somalia. More than that, it is essential to examine 
whether economic recovery is occurring at the same pace and align-
ment with political and social recovery. If this is not the case, as we will 
argue, peace-building gains may be temporary. The roots of conflict 
are grown in the fertile soil of economic desperation.
The contribution of this article is to provide an overview of economic 
recovery in Somalia that is largely absent from the academic litera-
ture. We collate and summarise the most recent quantitative statistics 
available and match these against qualitative information, including 
government reports and economic analysis. Our primary conclusion 
is a positive one; for the first time in more than two decades, Soma-
lia’s economy is finally beginning to recover. Growth has returned. 
New market opportunities are being generated. The trade structure 
is diversifying and confidence is rising among investors, the diaspora 
and donors. To be clear, this trajectory is fragile. Political uncertainties 
and the looming arrival of oil exploration are threats that we discuss in 
this regard. Nonetheless, our primary thesis is that the five years since 
the establishment of the Federal Government has been, on balance, a 
positive period for economic reconstruction in Somalia.
Our paper is structured as follows. We first make the case for the 
importance of economic development despite the massive social and 
political challenges that prevail in Somalia. We then outline the path-
way to recovery that has been delineated by the Federal Government. 
We assess progress along this route and then identify some of the 
major threats to further progress.
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II. Economic Recovery as a Peace-Building Tool
At first glance, it might seem callous to focus on economic recov-
ery when conflict persists and the humanitarian need in the country 
remains so severe. 855,000 people are facing acute food insecurity and 
the Humanitarian Appeal for 2015 is only 35 percent funded.7 FGS 
(2014) reports that one in 18 women die in childbirth, one in 10 women 
die before the age of one and only one in three Somalis have access to 
clean water.
Despite a hunger for grassroots reconciliation,8 instability persists 
and security concerns remain paramount. In addition to around 20,000 
Somali national forces,9 there are about 23,000 African Union Mission 
troops deployed in the country, with its casualties reportedly rising 
over 4,000. While most urban centres, including Mogadishu, are now 
under the control of the Federal Government or its allies, large swathes 
of rural areas remain uncontrolled. Even within urban areas, violence 
episodes persist, as attested by sporadic assassinations of senior policy 
makers and attacks on government compounds. According to an anon-
ymous source in Davis and Mills (2015), AK47s in Mogadishu remain 
as ubiquitous as umbrellas in London.
Given the urgency of these challenges, it does not seem surprising 
that economic developments have received comparatively less atten-
tion in academic circles than social and political ones. However, it is 
doubtful whether Somalia will ever fully recover if it does not develop 
an economy that meets the needs of its citizens in a sustainable way. 
As described in the country’s first Human Development Report pro-
duced by the United Nations Development Programme in 2013—
UNDP (2012)—“development without peace is not sustainable, and 
peace without development is not durable,” at page 17. So long as 82 
percent of Somalia’s population continue to live in multi-dimensional 
poverty and 75 percent of its youth remain without a job,10 any sem-
blance of peace will always remain fragile.
In fact, there is strong evidence that economic recovery is a power-
ful peace-building tool. In post-conflict countries, an economic growth 
rate of 10 percent is associated with a reduction in the risk of reverting 
to conflict within the next decade from 42 percent to 27 percent, Col-
lier et al. (2008). From the opposite perspective, if economic growth 
decreases by five percent, it raises the risk of conflict the next year by 
fifty percent, Miguel et al. (2004).
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One of the most direct mechanisms through which economic devel-
opment can contribute to the peace-building agenda is by increasing 
the opportunity cost of conflict. In other words, it can raise the cost of 
participating in violence by increasing the reward from abstaining. In 
Somalia, this mechanism may have particular resonance. According 
to Davis and Mills (2015), most of the new recruits to Al Shabaab are 
signing up because they are in need of income to pay off their debts. 
Creating peace-dependent jobs would reduce this flow.
That is not to say that an economic recovery agenda should be pri-
oritised above humanitarian assistance or stabilisation programmes. 
Far from it. The underlying thesis of this article is that security and 
humanitarian assistance should remain priorities, but that economic 
recovery must be a concomitant consideration. Assistance will not pro-
duce durable results if the underlying drivers of vulnerability are not 
addressed. So long as economic recovery initiatives do not compro-
mise the achievement of immediate humanitarian needs, they should 
be pursued with vigour and commitment.
III. Mapping out a Path to Economic Recovery
The Council of Ministers approved the Economic Recovery Plan for 
2014–15 in September 2013. The short-term aim of the plan is to sup-
port the most productive sectors by providing stability and rehabil-
itating critical infrastructure. In the long term, the aim is to achieve 
“sustained economic development and poverty alleviation, founded 
on responsible macroeconomic management, infrastructure rehabili-
tation and equitable access to services,’ FGS (2013) at page 3. The Plan 
requires 642 million United States Dollars (USD) of external financ-
ing, however flagship programmes have been prioritised that would 
require less than one third of this; 222 million USD. The flagship pro-
grammes include upgrading state capacity, rehabilitating key infra-
structure and getting one million children to school.
One of the limitations of the Plan is that it only applies to South 
Central Somalia. This is on the basis Puntland and Somaliland are at 
a different position in terms of development, peace and stability. They 
also already have similar development plans. However, it is hoped that 
the Plan will eventually precede a poverty reduction strategy paper for 
all of Somalia.
The Plan is based on a broader platform set by the Federal Govern-
ment in the form of its Six Pillars Manifesto. These pillars are good 
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governance, economic recovery, peace building and reconciliation, 
unity and integrity, service delivery and international relations. The 
Economic Recovery Plan is relevant to them all, but directly relevant to 
economic recovery and service delivery.
IV. The Scale of the Challenge
Economic recovery from an episode of conflict takes a long time. As a 
rough example, instability in Burundi during the 1990s lead to notable 
reductions in living standards.
It was not until 2007, nearly 20 years later, that Burundi’s gross 
national income returned to the same level that it had been in 1988. 
Across the border, in neighbouring Rwanda, it has been estimated that 
six years after the conflict, GDP per capita remained 25–30 percent 
lower than it would have been had the conflict not occurred, Lopez 
(2005).11 This is partly due to the fact that violence tends to repeat 
itself.12 Indeed, some have even questioned whether full economic 
recovery is even possible.13
The magnitude of the task stands in contrast to the urgency of the 
current, pressing needs. Members of the Federal Government have 
been urged to “make a difference quickly, raise taxes to do so includ-
ing building infrastructure and paying salaries, and stay alive,” Mills 
et al. (2013). This is no mean feat.
Perhaps the greatest challenge is infrastructure. The public energy 
supply is broken, leaving the vast majority of Somalis reliant on char-
coal and firewood for their household needs.14 This is despite the fact 
that the country has some of the greatest potential for developing 
wind15 and solar16 power generation in Africa. Health infrastructure 
also remains inadequate. For instance, there were four doctors per 
100,000 people, compared with the Africa-wide average of 58, during 
the period 2007–2009, per AfDB (2013a). Roads are dilapidated because 
there has been no major investment in transport infrastructure since 
the 1980s. Meanwhile, the solutions are not self-evident. In the case of 
transport infrastructure, for example, Ali et al. (2015) makes a strong 
case that unless investments are carefully designed and accompanied 
by improvements in governance, they are unlikely to result in any long 
term benefits.
A dearth of education opportunities is producing a workforce of 
low productivity and few skills.17 This creates shortages in critical 
areas, which generates the paradoxical situation that despite having 
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colossal unemployment rates, Somalia still imports skilled labour from 
neighbouring countries. Even high profile government institutions, 
such as the Central Bank of Somalia, report difficulties in attracting 
staff with the necessary technical and professional skills. With an adult 
literacy rate of 24 percent, it will take many years to build the human 
capital necessary for a flourishing economy.
Tied with this challenge is the need to create jobs, particularly for 
the youth. Three-quarters of the population are younger than 30 years 
old, UNFPA (2014). The high fertility rate and low life expectancy (esti-
mated at about 50) means that this proportion is more likely to further 
increase over time rather than decrease. Two thirds of youth surveyed 
by UNDP in 2012 reported that they intend to leave the country. In 
south central Somalia, this proportion was 97 percent. Getting a well-
paid job was the main reason cited by 64 percent of those intending 
to leave, while better educational opportunities and escaping from 
conflict were cited by 17 percent of respondents, UNDP (2012). As was 
discussed above, a failure to create jobs for these youth also comes 
with the risk of strengthening the drivers of conflict.
At the same time, the creation of jobs requires a strong private sector. 
The private sector needs finance. Unfortunately, the financial sector in 
Somalia is not functioning well. Credit is limited, the currency is not 
trusted and the Central Bank has limited ability to regulate the indus-
try.18 The formal financial sector has been retarded by the conflict.19
Meanwhile, regulation changes in the United States are threatening the 
steady flow of remittances. This could have serious implications given 
that the African Development Bank estimates that remittances provide 
up to 40 percent of household income. Reports are emerging of money 
transfer agents personally delivering money in suitcases, by catching 
a plane from the United States to Dubai, where it is then funnelled 
through to Somalia using the hawala system.20
In all, there are a number of factors, which illustrate that the scale of 
the challenge is immense. The process of economic recovery will take 
many years. Nonetheless, there are positive signs that the country is at 
least heading in the right direction.
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V. Signs of Progress
Reconstruction of the Somali economy is evident in the areas of 
growth, confidence and trade.
A. Growth
Somalia’s economy is growing again. While accurate data is difficult 
to attain,21 it is generally agreed that the economy stagnated during 
the conflict. Since 2008, however, our best estimates are that growth 
has returned. The economy grew by 3.7 percent in real terms in 2014, 
according to IMF (2015). The main sources of growth were in the areas 
of agriculture, construction and telecommunications. Looking for-
ward, growth is expected to continue. The IMF expects the economy to 
grow by 2.7 percent 2015 and then hover close to 4 percent in 2016 and 
2017. Based on the research described above, this would suggest that 
the likelihood of increased conflict is reducing.
There are also isolated, but more tangible signs of economic growth. 
Port activity in Mogadishu is growing, as is construction within the 
city.22 Investments in renewable energy are simultaneously tapping 
into some of Somalia’s most abundant natural resources (its wind and 
its sunlight) while also breaking up the choking grip that small groups 
of elite businessmen have exerted over traditional energy supplies.23
New sources of income are also emerging. The fisheries sector, for 
example, has the potential to generate significant numbers of jobs, 
with USAID (2014) suggesting that four jobs would be created on land, 
for every one job created at sea. Fish stocks in the area are the only 
“under-fished” stocks left on the planet according to the FAO.24 Most 
of the stocks are found in deep-sea areas, beyond the continental shelf. 
The deep-sea fishing beyond the continental shelf has the most abun-
dant fish stocks. The country may be about to access these areas due to 
the ongoing construction of new vessels and the necessary facilities to 
process the fish caught. At the same time, the Federal Government is 
negotiating with Spanish, French and Taiwanese companies who are 
already fishing these stocks, to ensure that the Somalia government 
receives a share of their revenue.
The scale of the opportunity is best demonstrated by the extent 
to which it is currently being missed. Large schools of tuna migrate 
along the coast of East Africa and concentrate in Somali waters. Yet it is 
cheaper in Puntland to buy imported canned tuna from Thailand than 
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it is to buy any of the local tuna. Indeed, fishing tends to be limited 
to small-scale, artisanal activities. Investments in boats, training and 
modern fishing techniques should quickly yield sustainable increases 
in income. One may argue that the industry will always be constrained 
by the common distaste that Somalis have for eating fish, a lack of 
investment in the value chain, instability on land, piracy at sea or a 
combination of the above.25 Yet many of these factors are changing. 
Piracy rates off the coast of Puntland, for example, have decreased dra-
matically to the point that the area internationally identified as high 
risk has recently (October 2015) been formally reduced. Other security 
improvements and improved investment flows present an opportunity 
to develop the sector and exploit the longest coastline of any country 
in Africa.
To be fair, reaching a rapid pace of economic growth is one thing. 
Achieving high quality economic growth that creates meaningful jobs 
and meets the needs of citizens is a more ambitious and much more 
important agenda. Even in this respect, however, there are positive 
signs. Agriculture is the backbone of Somalia’s economy, making up 
two thirds of its GDP and employing a similar proportion of its work-
force. In the north of Somalia, primarily Somaliland and Puntland, the 
primary form of agriculture is the production of livestock. In the much 
less arid South-Central Somalia, two main rivers and more consistent 
rainfall enable planting and the production of crops. For many years, 
however, this sector has failed to meet the needs of its citizens. Food 
production per person fell during the years of the civil war.26
Yet this downward trend has also stopped, or may have even 
reversed. The most recent data suggests that food production per cap-
ita is now growing again, albeit at a modest level.27 Some of Somalia’s 
traditional produce before the war, such as bananas,28 are now being 
grown again. A number of small, discrete interventions have achieved 
productivity gains.29 The small-scale nature of farming and the absence 
of modern equipment also suggest that there are numerous opportuni-
ties for rapid and significant improvements in yield, despite the harsh 
environment. Indeed, the size of the potential agricultural yields is 
reported to be much larger than national demand, suggesting that a 
sustainable export market could eventually become a viable option.
At the same time, a major risk in conflict-affected countries is infla-
tion.30 Shortages in basic foods, intermediate goods and key services 
can lead to rising prices that wipe out any gains that one might expect 
from high rates of economic growth. This has occurred in Somalia 
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in the past. For example, between 1992 and 1995, the weighted aver-
age annual rate of inflation was 331.2 percent, AfDB (2013b). More 
recently, the presence of multiple fake currencies in circulation led to 
skyrocketing prices in 2007, according to the Central Bank of Somalia. 
The effects of such inflation tend to hurt the poor the most. In a 2013 
survey of Daynile settlement in Mogadishu, 91 percent of respondents 
reported that food was their highest cost, USAID (2013).
At the moment, however, it appears that inflation is better con-
tained. According to the Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit 
(FSNAU) backed by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations,31 consumer price inflation has remained broadly sta-
ble at a national level in the three years following the famine of 2011. 
More recently, IMF (2015) estimated that consumer price inflation was 
1.3 percent in 2014, that it should remain at about 4 percent in 2015, 
and then fall to 3 percent in 2016 and 2017. Unskilled wages have also 
remained stable. Meanwhile, the sale price of livestock have recorded 
mild, but steady increases.32 Finally, the terms of trade of local labour-
ers (or their ability to afford basic necessitates like cereal) has been 
declining, although only at mild to moderate levels, FSNAU (2015b).
In all, a more promising picture emerges than one might expect 
from a country in Somalia’s position. Indeed, and perhaps most impor-
tantly, inflationary pressures are not eliminating the improvements in 
welfare that economic growth can bring. Somalia’s economic recovery 
is generating the dividends of peace.
B. Confidence
Economic recovery is more than numbers alone. Sentiment is central. 
In this respect, an important recent dynamic is the return of the dias-
pora. According to the HIPS (2014), “[d]ata on the scale of diaspora 
return is lacking. It is, however, broadly acknowledged, based on the 
increasing visibility of the diaspora in society, that there has been a 
steady increase in returns in the past few years.” This is consistent with 
other partial evidence. Passenger volumes through Mogadishu’s inter-
national airport are increasing, with arrivals outpacing departures.33
Google searches for “flights to Somalia” have increased notably34 with 
major airlines, including Turkish Airlines and Qatar Airways, now 
offering direct flights to Mogadishu. Meanwhile, the rise and momen-
tum behind the Twitter hashtag “SomaliaRising” represented a surge 
of optimism on social media.
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The return of diaspora is notable for the fact that it signals an 
increasing faith in the security situation and the prospects of the Somali 
economy. It also brings valuable skills, money and international con-
nections. Of course, it can also generate problems. For example, con-
cerns have arisen among some Somali that their ‘fair-weather friends’ 
are parachuting in to take jobs and political opportunities, Hammond, 
et al. (2011). On balance, however, the prevailing dynamic is a positive 
one. From an economic perspective at least, the returning diaspora are 
giving momentum to the recovery.
Investors are also showing increasing faith in Somalia’s future. 
Domestic investment is increasing with local businesses increasingly 
reinvesting their profits in the local economy. International investors 
are also contributing. Between 1997 and 2005, net foreign direct invest-
ment to Somalia was at very low levels; at around $2 million USD per 
year. Since then, it has increased nearly 5,000% to $107 million per year 
(2006–2014).35
Finally, an increasingly broad range of international donors are 
exhibiting confidence in Somalia. According to the Ministry of Finance, 
“non-traditional donors” provide two-thirds of budget support. In 
fact, budget support in 2014 and 2015 includes contributions from 
Turkey, the Arab League, Qatar, China, Nigeria and the United Arab 
Emirates. The Organisation for Islamic Cooperation is also increasing 
its presence in the country, launching its largest ever relief operation in 
response to the 2011 famine.36
Diversification of the aid supply may increase the reliability of its 
flow as well as the ability of the Federal Government to direct funds 
received towards the specific areas it wishes to prioritise. In total, aid 
flows to Somalia have increased from 240 million USD in 2005, to 
around 1 billion each year in since 2011 in current prices. A survey of 
forward spending plans among donors suggests that these flows may 
increase by three percent between 2014 and 2015.37 While promising, 
not all programmes in Somalia have benefited from this increase; the 
Humanitarian Appeal for 2015 remains only 35 percent funded as at 
August 2015.
In summary, the Somali diaspora, investors and international 
donors are all becoming increasingly more willing to place a bet that 




A final source of optimism is one that capitalises on Somalia’s stron-
gest geographical asset—its location. A major shipping route passes 
Somalia on its way to the Suez Canal, where close to 10 percent of the 
world’s sea-borne trade passes through. As a result, Somalia is in an 
excellent position to participate in international trade. A collection of 
evidence suggests that this is gradually beginning to occur once again.
Somalia’s main export is livestock. During the conflict, this industry 
was massively affected, with exports of live animals falling as low as 
23 million USD. Since 2008, however, things have changed. In the five 
years to 2013, the value of Somali livestock exports have grown 38% 
on average every year. The most recent data confirms that this growth 
continued into 2014. In that year, the country exported the largest 
number of livestock for two decades.38 According to the International 
Trade Centre, the value of Somalia’s exports grew 131% between 2009 
to 2013. Most importantly, 40% of this increase was due to improve-
ments in competitiveness, and not external factors such as world trade 
volumes. One such source of improved competitiveness has been dis-
ease control and surveillance, particularly in goat rearing.
This picture may appear to be very optimistic. However, the quality 
of the data available is slightly stronger in the area of trade. This is 
because there are multiple reference points upon which to compare 
reported data and fill in the gaps.39 While the process is not free from 
flaws,40 it can provide insightful glimpses into the structure and per-
formance of the external economy. In the case of Somalia, it certainly 
appears to do this. A line-by-line comparison of goods and services 
coming in and out of Somalia suggests that the structure of its econ-
omy may be changing. Comparing the five years before and after 2008, 
we find that imports of some luxury consumption goods, like man-
ufactured tobacco, have decreased significantly; by 58 percent in the 
case of tobacco.41 In contrast, imports of goods that are more useful 
for growing an economy, like civil engineering and contractors’ plant 
and equipment, tractors, lighting fixtures and fittings have all grown 
by 411%, 448% and 360%. In short, growth conducive imports are up 
while luxury consumption goods are down.
To be clear, only a very small proportion of the Somali population 
participates in international trade. Also, in the long road to recovery, 
these are modest gains. Somali exporters in particular, will need to lift 
their performance considerably if they are to compete on the interna-
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tional stage. The confidence that foreign consumers have in the quality 
of their exports is low. Even if it was high, there are no established 
quality standards or regulatory system.42 This forces Somalia’s trading 
partners to send their own people to monitor quality standards in pro-
duction. It has also meant that some Somali exporters are reportedly 
mislabelling their goods to hide their Somali origins.
In all, however, it is clear that Somalia’s participation in interna-
tional trade is in the healthiest position that it has been for more than 
twenty years. The export sector is generating revenues and there is 
considerable potential for further growth.
VI. A Fragile Trajectory
The preceding analysis has made the case that for the first time in 
recent history, the economy of the world’s most conflict affected 
nations is finally starting to recovery. However, it would be naïve to 
assume that success is guaranteed. One particular threat to this trajec-
tory is oil. Indeed, the commercial exploitation of oil is on the horizon 
for Somalia. This could either knock the country off its pathway to 
recovery or accelerate it further along its way.
Blathasar (2014) suggests that there could be as much as 110 billion 
barrels of oil in Somalia. Exploration began as early as 1956. A number 
of concessions were awarded in the 1980s and then ended through 
force majeure clauses due to the conflict. It is only now, however, 
that development drilling is a realistic and imminent possibility. The 
Federal Government signed its first oil deal with Soma Oil and Gas, 
a company based in the United Kingdom. Soma Oil and Gas has per-
mission to conduct seismic surveys and produce an assessment of oil 
and gas potential, due to be completed in 2015. In Somaliland, another 
United Kingdom based company has a production sharing contract for 
an onshore area of 22,840 square kilometres, known as the Odewayne 
block, EIU (2014).
The exploitation of oil presents significant revenue potential for 
the Federal Government which cannot be ignored. At the moment, 
the Federal Government’s tax base is small and concentrated.43 Efforts 
to diversify the revenue base and tax companies and citizens have 
been meet with violence.44 A steady flow of royalties from oil revenues 
would relieve this pressure.
The problem, however, is that exploiting these resources comes with 
major political risks. In particular, the presence of oil in both Puntland 
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and Somaliland raises important questions about revenue sharing and 
coordination between central and regional government entities. This 
adds even more heat to the pressure cooker environment in which the 
federalisation project is being developed. Indeed, oil related issues 
have already threatened harmonious relations between the federal and 
regional governments.45 A majority of respondents in a recent, albeit 
small, survey in Somalia reported that they felt that the current fed-
eralisation process was deeply flawed.46 The exploitation of oil could 
further expose these divisions if it is not correctly managed. Moreover, 
there is a risk that the 2016 elections could become a focal point for this 
division, which would have serious economic implications.
Even if revenue sharing arrangements are agreed, there will be 
much policy and legislative work required before the country is in a 
position to fully maximise the benefits from oil exploitation. In the 
Government’s own words, “there is a lack of an effective petroleum 
and legal framework that meets the requirements of all stakeholders,” 
FGS (2013) at page 74. The historical relationship between conflict in 
Africa and the exploitation of natural resources demands a careful and 
measured approach.47
At the same time, oil exploitation introduces complexities on the 
international stage. In particular, relations with Kenya are already 
strained by the June 2013 decision of the Somali Cabinet to extend its 
Exclusive Economic Zone under the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea to include six downstream oil and gas exploration 
blocks. Kenya has already sold these blocks to international compa-
nies, Reitano and Shaw (2013). Navigating this issue will be compli-
cated given the crucial contribution that Kenyan troops make to the 
African Union Mission in Somalia. In addition, international compa-
nies who lost their rights to concession areas in other parts of Somalia 
during the 1990s may well raise disputes if commercial drilling begins 
in those areas again. This would also be a complicated issue given the 
desire of the Federal Government to attract international investment 
into the country.
Finally, any production of oil will require a production-sharing 
agreement between the company in question and Somali authorities. 
These are notoriously political documents that can generate discontent. 
For example, a draft production-sharing agreement between Soma 
Oil & Gas Holdings Ltd and the Federal Government caused outrage 
when it emerged that the proposal could potentially lead to Soma Oil 
accruing 90 percent of oil revenues.48 While oil prices have fallen and 
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will remain low for the next year at least,49 the political importance of 
oil has hardly changed. As Ahmad (2015) notes, for a political system 
to be durable in Somalia, citizens will have to be convinced that polit-
ical power is not merely a proxy for clan power or sub-clan power. 
Managing oil revenues in such a way will be an exceptionally difficult 
task.
In short, Somalia’s economy may be recovering, but it is being 
forced to navigate a precarious path. While sound policies and inter-
national support will be essential, some measure of good fortune may 
also be required if it is to capitalise on the current opportunities and 
emerge as a more peaceful, prosperous country.
VII. Conclusion
Economic recovery in Somalia was never going to be simple. The com-
plexity of the political environment, the scale of the conflict and the 
breadth in the diversity of interests eliminated that possibility from 
day one. For many years, progress was elusive. Then, at the end of the 
first decade of the twenty-first century, it appeared that things might 
be changing. Small signs were emerging that Somalia, and its econ-
omy, might have been in the process of turning the corner. However, 
until now, there has not been an holistic analysis of whether these 
signs were isolated and peripheral, or whether they were representa-
tive of something more fundamental. The key point of this article is to 
conduct such analysis and present a body of evidence suggesting that 
Somalia’s economy is finally beginning to recovery. Quantitative and 
qualitative information in the areas of growth, trade and confidence 
have been advanced in support of this conclusion. There is no doubt 
that the momentum behind recovery is fragile and will remain so. 
Nonetheless, the general trajectory is a positive one. Somalia’s econ-
omy is rising.
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Notes
1. For example, the United States officially recognised the Federal Government of Soma-
lia in January 2013. Three months later, the IMF also recognised the Government, which 
allowed relations to resume for the first time in 22 years.
2. Between October 2014 and January 2015 alone, Mogadishu received the Secretary-Gen-
eral of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon, the President of the World Bank, Jim Yong Kim 
and the President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. During this period, the Intergov-
ernment Authority on Development also held a meeting in Mogadishu for the first time 
since 1985.
3. Except for temporary advances that are considered necessary to smooth revenue flows 
during one financial year.
4. Stewart (2013).
5. AfDB (2013b) at page 1.
6. On 12 May 2015, the International Office for Migration reported that 4,826 refugees 
from Yemen had been registered in Somalia, with a further 9,703 in registered in Dji-
bouti. Earlier (March 2015) the United Nations Refugee Agency estimated that perhaps 
as many as 100,000 would arrive in Somaliland alone during the remainder of 2015, per 
Magdaleno (2015).
7. As at August 2015, per OCHA (2015).
8. Rapid consultations for the Economic Recovery Plan (discussed further below) found 
that the consulted communities “had one thing in common: they expressed grassroots 
reconciliations and service delivery as their absolute priorit[ies],” FGS (2013) at page 
39. A 2012 survey by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) of youth in 
Somalia (of the ages 14 to 29) found that two-thirds of respondents reported an intention 
to leave Somalia. Getting a well-paid job was the main reason cited by 64 percent of 
those intending to leave, UNDP (2012).
9. The Secretary-General’s most recent report on Somalia—UNSG (2015)—notes that 
13,829 Somalia national army and 5,134 police force personnel are biometrically regis-




11. Semeels and Verpoorten (2013) also find that areas within Rwanda that conflict of 
greater intensity were still significantly lagging behind other areas in terms of consump-
tion per capita, six years on.
12. For example, the 2011 World Development Report notes that since 2003, every new 
civil war that has begun was the resumption of a previous civil conflict.
13. See Cerra and Saxena (2007).
14. 87 percent of Somalia’s energy consumption is through the use of charcoal and fire-
wood, FGS (2013).
15. More than half of Somalia records average wind speeds of more than 6 metres per 
second, while is highly suitable for electric energy generation, International Energy 
Association, Africa Energy Outlook; Nunez, Powering progress.
16. Somalia records one of the highest daily averages of total solar radiation in world 
and receives an average of 3,000 hours per year of sunlight, Nunez, Powering progress.
17. It has been reported that 90% of the education infrastructure was destroyed while the 
estimated school participation rates have reached as low as single figures.
18. United States dollars are used for large transaction with Somali Shillings used for 
the rest. The Shillings tend to be counterfeit, old, falling apart or all of the above. Mean-
while, the Central Bank does not yet have any ability to control money flows or foreign 
currency exchange rates.
19. Recent evidence from Afghanistan suggests that the lack of development of formal 
financial networks may be due to persistent conflict, Blumenstock et al. (2014). This 
is because populations experiencing episodes of violence tend to prefer holding cash 
rather than other financial instruments, such as mobile money. From a positive perspec-
tive, this suggests that as conflict gradually reduces in Somalia, there may also be a grad-
ual improvement in financial intermediation and the development of a formal network.
20. See Trindle (2015) for further elaboration.
21. According to AfDB (2013b), “Somalia is still characterized by a severe lack of basic 
economic and social statistics.” at page 2. As at September 2013, the Central Bureau of 
Statistics had nine core staff, only three of whom had a university degree. It also did not 
have a permanent office, FGS (2014).
22. The number of ships docking at the Mogadishu Port doubled in the first quarter of 
2013, according to Gatehouse (2013).
23. Collusion among energy providers, a lack of investment and inefficient business 
modes have caused the price of electricity in Somalia to be more than one USD per kilo-
what hour—one of the highest prices in the world, according to USAID (2014).
24. To be clear, not all fish stocks in the region are under-fished. In particular, fish stocks 
on the continental shelf close to shore are vulnerable according to USAID (2014) due to 
the fact that the shelf is narrow, the fish stocks are small and the coral reefs are fragile. 
Lobster is one of the few types of seafood that have been successfully exported from this 
region. Lobster stocks are now being depleted.
25. “Somalis in general have had very limited interest in fishing and their seafood con-
sumption is thought to be among the lowest in the world” Persson et al., “Failed State: 
Reconstruction of domestic fisheries catches in Somalia…” Persson (2014) at page 111.
26. Food production per capita, fell by an average of 2.9 percent per year during the 
period 1997–2002. It then fell 1.4 percent during 2002–2007, FAO (2015).
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27. Specifically, food production per capita is estimated to have grown 0.4 percent per 
year on average during the period 2007–2012, FAO (2015).
28. Italian colonialists brought banana farming to the Shebelle and Juba basins in the 
1920s. The industry grew rapidly, driven by investment from Italian and American com-
panies. In the 1980s, the industry reached its peak, exporting about 96 million USD per 
year. However, the industry collapsed during the civil war and it is only beginning to be 
regenerated now, Kushkush (2014).
29. For example, a recent intervention involving the provision of training and resources 
led to a 50 percent increase in crop production across 60,000 Somali households, FGS 
(2014).
30. Very high inflation inflicted Iraq, for instance, between 2003 and 2008, as discussed in 
Grigorian and Kock (2010).
31. Relative to other economic variables, inflation is well monitored in Somalia thanks to 
the Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit. This Unit collects data in nearly 100 rural 
and urban markets.
32. This is due to a combination of high demand (within Somalia and abroad) as well as 
improving cattle condition.
33. Between October 2012 and March 2013, the passenger volumes going through Mog-
adishu’s Aden Abdulle International Airport increased by 47%. The number of arrivals 
more than doubled while the number of departing passengers decreased slightly, Busi-
ness Daily (2013).
34. These searches were close to non-existent between 2004 and 2010. They then 
increased 71% in 2012 alone and have remained at high levels since, per author’s analysis 
of data from Google Trends.
35. Calculated using data from UNCTAD (2015), which is in current prices and used 
current exchange rates.
36. Svoboda (2015) provides a detailed discussion on the changing role of the Organisa-
tion for Islamic Cooperation in Somalia and in humanitarian assistance.
37. Calculated using data from OECD (2015).
38. In total, the exported amounted to 4.6 million goats and sheep, 340,000 cattle and 
77,000 camels. The total value of these exports was 360 million, FSNAU (2015a).
39. Domestically reported data can be crosschecked against the trade flows declared by 
Somalia’s trading partners, who should effectively produce mirror statistics. This is a 
process referred to as “mirroring.”
40. Deriving trade data through mirroring is a second-best alternative to using the 
country’s national statistics. One of the reasons is that it can be difficult to identify the 
true source of a traded good (for example, goods may be exported by one country then 
re-exported to the country in question). The value of goods can also be confused because 
exports are usually calculated on one basis (using cost, insurance and freight, often 
referred to as CIF), while imports are calculated using other basis (the free on board 
value, often referred to as FOB).
41. Imports of tobacco and tobacco manufactures have fallen from around 60 million in 




42. A Turkish company—PGM Firm—was recently appointed by the Federal Govern-
ment to inspect the quality of Somali imports and exports. However, it is too early to 
ascertain the affect that this will have on the market.
43. Most tax revenue comes from the port and airport in Mogadishu, with little business 
or income tax. This form of tax is inefficient and leaves the government vulnerable to 
business cycles and the actions of a small group of people.
44. There were 130 tax collectors in Mogadishu, as at October 2014. Between 2012 and 
this date, nearly 30 tax collectors had been murdered. The head of the taxation and rev-
enue department subsequently reported that armed guards must now accompany tax 
collectors, Mohamed (2014). Before the Federal Government was established, the Islamic 
Court Union also encountered violent resistance when they sought to introduce taxation 
measures, Harper (2012).
45. As Reitano and Shaw (2013) discusses in more detail, the sale of exclusive exploration 
rights by the Puntland authorities led a legal dispute between the Puntland authorities 
and the transitional Federal Government which is not yet fully resolved.
46. HIPS interviewed 213 people in five cities: Mogadishu, Baido, Kismayo, Galkayo 
and Garowe. 68 percent of respondents reported that they support a federal system of 
governance as the best way to share power across clans. In Mogadishu, 56 percent of 
respondents reported that they viewed the current federalisation process to be flawed. 
75 percent of respondents in Baidoa were dissatisfied with the process, while Kismayo 
was the only city where a majority (60 percent) of respondents expressed support for the 
current process, HIPS (2015).
47. In the mineral sector, recent research suggests that mining in Africa is associated with 
an increase in conflict in the area where the minerals are found. This conflict can then 
spread into other areas within the country by providing a source of finance to the groups 
that are fighting, Berman (2015).
48. See Gridneff (2015) for example.
49. Oil prices fell by close to 50 percent in the second half of 2014 and are expected to 
remain low at least until the end of 2016 World Bank Group (2015).
